Should deterrence fail, the U.S. Navy’s mission is the forward defense of the United States and its allies. The key objective is protection of SLOCs from the United States to Europe and Asia. To accomplish that objective, the U.S. Navy will engage Soviet naval forces in the Soviet “sea control” and “sea denial” zones. The overall objective of the engagement will be to remove the enemy’s offensive and defensive capabilities and ensure freedom of the seas for the United States and its allies while deterring Soviet use of nuclear weapons at sea. SUBMARINES. —The last U.S. diesel sub- marine,    the USS Blueback (SS 581), was decommissioned on 1 October 1990. The remaining U.S. attack submarine force is composed of Sturgeon-, Skipjack-, Skate-, Permit-, and Los  Angeles-class  nuclear-powered  submarines (SSNs). The United States SSBNs form the sea leg of the U.S. Trident nuclear deterrent. The SSBN force includes the Lafayette-, James Madison-, Benjamin Franklin-, and Ohio-class submarines (fig. 1-6). The United States has a smaller, but more effective, submarine force than the Soviets because of a superior knowledge of submarine technology. That technology has resulted in superior submarine quieting systems, combat systems, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) open ocean acoustic surveillance and detection systems. These systems enable the United States and its allies to maintain a superior technological and numerical advantage over the Soviet submarine force. The principle Soviet platform for both offensive and defensive naval warfare is the submarine. The Soviets use the SSBN as their principle strategic platform. They use attack (SS and SSN) and cruise missile (SSGN) submarines to counter submarine and surface ship threats. The SS, SSN, and SSGN submarines are the primary threat to U.S. and allied sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The Soviet navy has the world’s largest general-purpose submarine force, totaling about 300 active units. We expect the Soviets to decrease their submarine force in number during the 1990s and beyond. That decrease will occur as they replace older sub- marines with newer diesel and nuclear-powered submarines. The decrease in the total number of submarines will not lessen the threat of their submarine force because of improvements in design, stealth, and combat capability. SURFACE SHIPS. —The Soviet Union and the U.S. naval surface forces have different missions (fig. 1-7). The Soviets are primarily a coastal navy emerging into a blue water fleet. The Soviets can provide only limited long-range power projection of surface forces or naval air superiority. These limitations result from their primary mission of providing protection to the mainland and defending the ballistic missile submarine force close to the mainland. The principle weakness of the Soviet navy is its relative lack of priority in providing underway replenishment. The Soviets rely on their extensive merchant fleet to provide supplies to ships engaged in sustained long-range operations. Another weakness of the Soviet surface navy is the lack of long-range air power like that provided by a U.S. carrier battle group. That situation will change somewhat as aircraft carriers now under construction are brought into service during the 1990s. AIRCRAFT. —Soviet shipborne capable air- craft are primarily limited to helicopters and vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft. The Soviets are increasing their air capability with the introduction of the new Tbilisi- class aircraft carrier that will include the new Yak-41 V/STOL fighter and the Su-27 Flanker. Despite the introduction of that class of aircraft carrier, Soviet naval aviation (refer to table 1-1) will remain primarily a land-based force. U.S. naval aviation (refer to table 1-2) is a versatile multimission force capable of providing fleet defense, ASW, and long-range strike and attack capability. The United States should continue to retain a significant advantage in seaborne air power for the foreseeable future. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS The increase of chemical and biological weapons has become a global problem. To date, more countries than ever have chemical and biological weapons. It is alarming that many of these countries are in areas of strategic importance to the United States. In the Middle East the problem is particularly acute. Third World countries view the use of chemical and biological weapons differently than the United States. The United States’ stance on chemical and biological weapons is “that it is abhorrent, reprehensible, and unacceptable that chemical weapons ever be used against the men 1-12